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Abstract
We develop a theory of endogenous uncertainty where the ability of investors to learn about
firm-level fundamentals declines during financial crises. At the same time, higher uncertainty
reinforces financial distress, causing a persistent cycle of uncertainty, pessimistic expectations,
and financial constraints. Through this channel, a temporary shortage of funds can develop into
a long-lasting funding problem for firms. Financial crises are characterized by increased credit
misallocation, volatile asset prices, high risk premia, an increased cross-sectional dispersion of
returns, and high levels of disagreement among forecasters. A numerical example suggests that
the proposed channel may significantly delay recovery from financial shocks.
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1 Introduction
Financial crises often entail deep and long-lasting recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Hall,
2014; Ball, 2014). A common view gives a central role to uncertainty, both as an amplifier of
financial distress and a source of slow recovery from financial shocks.1 This paper explores this idea,
developing a theory that formalizes the interaction between financial constraints and uncertainty.
The theory provides a narrative on how a temporary disturbance of the financial sector is
reinforced and amplified by endogenously rising uncertainty, developing into a long-lasting crisis of
the real economy. The theory is consistent with a number of stylized facts from previous financial
crises, such as the one in 2008/09: (i) persistently reduced hiring and output; (ii) volatile asset prices
and high risk premia; (iii) an increased cross-sectional dispersion of returns (iv) the contemporaneous
increase in measured uncertainty2; and (v) forecasts and expectations marked by high levels of
pessimism (relative to the true state of nature) as well as high levels of disagreement among
forecasters (Senga, 2016).
In the model, a firm’s funding depends on how investors assess the firm’s business conditions.
If investors find it likely that a firm is productive, funding to that firm is generous and the firm
achieves its unconstrained optimum. If, however, investors are pessimistic or uncertain regarding a
firm’s business potential, firms are financially constrained. When constraints are sufficiently tight,
firms are forced to become inactive since they cannot afford to pay fixed operating costs. The key
friction in our model is that agents do not learn the productivities of inactive firms even though
they perfectly know the productivities of active firms.
In this environment, a temporary tightening of a firm’s financial constraint can trigger a persistent
(and perfectly rational) period of increasing uncertainty and inactivity that can persistently disrupt
the firm’s access to funds. We refer to such episodes as “funding freezes”. Interestingly, the dynamics
of the second moments of agents’ beliefs interact with the first moments: lacking new information
during a funding freeze, any initially pessimistic beliefs persist into the future, making it even less
likely to exit the funding freeze.
The persistent effects of financial shocks at the firm-level carry over to aggregate financial shocks.
In particular, an aggregate shock to firms’ financial constraints increases the fraction of inactive
firms. This leads to greater uncertainty among investors and a rise in credit misallocation. The
misallocation manifests itself through decreases in output and hours that may persist even after
1For example, Olivier Blanchard (2009) speculated at the height of the recent financial crisis that “the crisis would
largely go away” if it were not for uncertainty, whereas Bloom et al. (2016) document how uncertainty was repeatedly
recognized by the Federal Open Market Committee as a driver of both, the recession that followed the dot-com bubble
in 2001, and the recent Great Recession. An increasing number of empirical studies further substantiates these ideas,
pointing to the Great Recession being likely “an acute manifestation of the toxic interaction between uncertainty and
financial shocks” (Caldara et al., 2016; see also Stein and Stone, 2013, Stock and Watson, 2012, and Gilchrist, Sim
and Zakrajˇsek, 2016).
2Unusually high levels of uncertainty during the recent financial crisis have been documented using a variety of
different approaches (see, e.g., Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015, Born, Breuer and Elstner, 2017, and the studies cited
in Footnote 1). Most closely related to the concept of uncertainty explored in this paper is the forecast-based evidence
given in Senga (2016), which documents a sharp increase in uncertainty regarding firm-level business conditions among
financial analysts.
1
financial stress has subsided. At the same time, the interaction between investors’ uncertainty
and firms’ funding conditions can account for an increase in investors’ average disagreement and
pessimism (even though all signals are unbiased), an increase in asset price volatility, and a divergence
in asset returns.
We explore the quantitative potential of our model in a simple calibration to the U.S. economy.
A novel aspect of our calibration is the explicit use of micro data on analyst forecasts, which we
use to pin down the information parameters of our model. Our numerical exercise suggests that
endogenously rising uncertainty may significantly delay recovery from financial shocks. Specifically,
we look at the model’s response to an exogenous tightening in financial constraints (with a half-life
of 5 quarters), and compare it with counterfactual responses, in which we shut down the impact
on uncertainty. While in the fixed-uncertainty counterfactual such as financial shock produces
a short-lived recession with the same 5-quarter half-life as the exogenous shock, the same shock
produces a long-lasting recession with a half-life of 11 quarters in the economy with endogenous
uncertainty.
Finally, we provide direct evidence for the link between uncertainty and financial constraints
predicted by the model. Using a combination of firm-level survey data, accounting data, and stock
prices, we look at correlations of measures of firms’ financial constraint and several proxies for
uncertainty. Supporting the main mechanism of our model, we find a significantly positive correlation
between financial constraints and all uncertainty proxies that is in line with the model-implied
correlations.
Related literature Our paper is related to a large and growing literature that introduces dispersed
information into macroeconomics (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2009; Angeletos and La’O, 2010, 2013; Amador
and Weill, 2010, 2012; Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Hassan and Mertens, 2014, 2017; Acharya,
2013; Hellwig and Venkateswaran, 2014; Chahrour and Gaballo, 2016). La’O (2010) shares with us
the combination of information heterogeneities with financial frictions, but considers a static model
with a constant level of uncertainty. David, Hopenhayn and Venkateswaran (2016) also analyze
information frictions as a source for factor misallocation, but focus on long-run consequences rather
than fluctuations driven by financial shocks.
Our paper also contributes to a recent literature that explores the role of endogenous fluctuations
in uncertainty for business cycles, including van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), Ordon˜ez
(2013), and Fajgelbaum, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017).3 In these papers, the level
of aggregate investment determines the amount of information and hence aggregate uncertainty.
An important distinction relative to these papers is this paper’s focus on uncertainty regarding
firm-specific fundamentals rather than economic aggregates (see Senga 2016 for a similar approach).4
3Studies of endogenous uncertainty in financial market settings include Veldkamp (2005), Yuan (2005), Albagli
(2011), and Sockin (2017). However, none of these papers considers spillovers from financial distress on the real
economy that are at the core of this paper.
4In a previous version of this paper, we have explored a version of our model where investors are learning about
aggregate business conditions instead (Straub and Ulbricht, 2012). While the two versions of the model are qualitatively
similar, we argue here that learning at a firm-level is more likely to be quantitatively important.
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On the one hand, this allows us to explain the above-mentioned stylized facts relating to the cross-
sectional distribution of firms and investor beliefs. On the other hand, this also helps overcoming
an important challenge of the endogenous uncertainty literature; namely that often unrealistically
large fluctuations in uncertainty are needed to generate a significant amplification. In our model,
learning breaks down when a firm is constrained, not when aggregate economic activity comes to
a stand-still, implying that the aggregate economy scales approximately proportionally with the
fraction of firms being constrained. Accordingly, even small variations in average uncertainty, can
have severe consequences.
A second difference to the existing endogenous uncertainty literature is that this paper links
financial crises and uncertainty through a novel mechanism, explaining why high levels of uncertainty
are particularly prevalent during financial crises. In our model, it is not the overall level of economic
activity that determines how much information about firms’ fundamentals is revealed; rather it is
the degree to which firms’ actions (investments, employment, production, etc) actually reflect these
fundamentals. This insight naturally implies that when a firm’s behavior is dictated by financial
constraints, rather than fundamentals, its actions carry less information.5
In our model, the emergence of uncertainty from financial distress interacts with propagation
of uncertainty through the financial sector. In support of such a financial transmission channel,
Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajˇsek (2016) present evidence that uncertainty strongly affects investments
via increasing credit spreads, but has virtually no impact on investments when controlling for credit
spreads. The financial transmission of uncertainty relates our model to a recent literature around
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014), Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2016), and Gilchrist, Sim and
Zakrajˇsek (2016), which stresses the importance of uncertainty (or risk) shocks in the financial
sector, but treats these shocks as exogenous.6
The predictions of our model are also broadly consistent with a recent empirical literature that
measures the effects of financial constraints. Giroud and Mueller (2017) show that establishments
of firms that are more likely to be financially constrained were heavily affected by falling collateral
values (house prices). In fact, they show that the entire correlation of employment loss and house
prices is explained by these arguably financially constrained firms. Similar in spirit, Chodorow-Reich
(2013) documents that firms borrowing from less healthy lenders experience relatively steeper declines
in employment during the financial crisis, consistent with the interpretation that these firms faced
tighter financial constraints. Our model clarifies how an intense but relatively short-lived financial
crisis can still translate into persistent financial constraints for firms, making it much harder for
5In the current draft, we simplify the exposition by looking at the extreme case where a firm’s action is either fully
informative (it operates) or fully uninformative (it is shut down by the financial market). The insight is, however,
more general, as we have shown in previous versions of this paper where information is lost even for constrained but
active firms.
6Two other related strands of the literature study the propagation of exogenous uncertainty through real options
as in Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2016), and Bachmann and Bayer (2013), and through risk premia as in the time-
varying (disaster) risk literature (e.g., Gabaix, 2012; Gourio, 2012). Related to the latter, Kozlowski, Veldkamp and
Venkateswaran (2017) explore a model where agents learn about tail-risks and where belief revisions after short-lived
financial shocks can have long-lasting effects. Similar, Nimark (2014) presents a mechanism that increases uncertainty
after rare events, if news selectively focus on outliers.
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them to weather such periods and retain their employment and capital.
Outline The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the model
economy. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 explains how persistent funding freezes
can emerge at the firm level. Section 5 analyzes the model’s response to aggregate shocks. Section 6
tests the mechanism at the core of the paper using micro data. Section 7 concludes and offers a few
policy insights.
2 Model
There is a continuum of islands of mass unity, indexed by i. Each island is inhabited by a single firm
and a representative household, who interact in a local labor market and a local financial market.
The firm uses the labor provided by the household to produce a differentiated consumption good.
To finance its wage bill, the firm must obtain working capital funding from the household. The
ability of the firm to obtain funding is restricted by a pledgeability constraint, which limits the
fraction of revenues that the firm can pledge in exchange for funds. Time is discrete with an infinite
horizon and is indexed by t.
Preferences and technology Households have GHH-preferences (Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Huffman, 1988), maximizing
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
1
1− γ u
1−γ
i,τ
with
ui,t = Ci,t − 1
1 + ζ
(
L1+ζi,t − v
)
,
where Li,t are hours worked, Ci,t is a composite consumption good given by
Ci,t =
[∫ 1
0
C
ξ−1
ξ
i,j,t dj
] ξ
ξ−1
,
and Ci,j,t is the consumption of good j by the household on island i. The preference parameters
satisfy γ, v > 0, ζ ≥ 0, β ∈ (0, 1) and ξ > 1.7
The output of the firm on island i is given by
Yi,t = Ai,t max{Li,t − φ, 0}, (1)
where φ > 0 is a fixed amount of overhead labor as in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta
7Throughout we assume that v is sufficiently large so that ui,t ≥ 0 a.s. at the households’ interior optimal labor
supply. This is needed because Ci,t will be random at the time where Li,t is chosen by the household.
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(2013). Log-productivities are given by
logAi,t = ρ logAi,t−1 + i,t, (2)
with ρ ∈ (0, 1), and the innovations i,t being i.i.d. (across islands and time), normal, with zero
mean and variance σ2 .
Pledgeability constraint Each period has two subperiods, a morning and an afternoon. Firms
operate subject to a working capital constraint that requires them to finance their wage bill in the
morning whereas production realizes in the afternoon. To raise funds, each firm issues claims on
current-period revenues to the local household, but is restricted in its ability to raise funds as only
a fraction χi,t ∈ (0, 1] of revenues is pledgeable.8 Let Qi,t denote the equilibrium valuation of firm
i’s expected revenues by the local household. Then the constraint on firm i’s labor input is given by
Li,t ≤ L¯i,t ≡ χi,tQi,t/Wi,t. (3)
The pledgeability limit χi,t is i.i.d. across islands, has finite support X ⊂ (0, 1], and follows a Markov
process with an aperiodic and irreducible transition matrix Ξ.
The timing of events within each period can be summarized as follows.
• Morning: pledgeability limits {χi,t} realize; labor and financial markets operate; firms issue
claims on pledgeable revenues and pay wages to households.
• Afternoon: productivities {Ai,t} realize and production occurs; product markets operate;
claims on revenues mature and dividends are paid; households consume.
Households Because the household on island i is the only one trading firm i’s assets, we have
that in equilibrium the local household holds a claim on χi,t units of the firm’s revenues. In addition
to its claims on pledgeable revenues, the local household is also residual shareholder to the local
firm’s profits. Accordingly, the budget constraint in the afternoon is
Ci,t = Zi,t + Wi,tLi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage-earnings
+ χi,t (Pi,tYi,t −Qi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
claim on pledgeable revenues
+ (1− χi,t)Pi,tYi,t + χi,tQi,t −Wi,tLi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
residual dividends
,
where Zi,t is the payoff from Arrow-Debreu securities that allow households to complete markets
in the morning contingent on all available information (described below). In this environment,
households can effectively insure themselves against all consumption losses that arise from the local
firm being financially constrained, whereas they continue to be exposed to uncertainty about current
operating profits.
8Limited pledgeability can be motivated in different ways, including limited commitment, private benefits, or
incentives to counter moral hazard (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). More general, we can think of χi,t as a proxy
for a firm’s dependence or ability to raise external funding.
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From the households’ optimization problem it follows that local labor supply is
Wi,t = L
ζ
i,t. (4)
Aggregating across islands, the inverse aggregate demand for good i is
Pi,t =
(
Yi,t
Yt
)−1/ξ
Pt, (5)
where Yt ≡
∫ 1
0 Ci,t di is aggregate demand for the composite good and
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ξi,t di
)1/(1−ξ)
is the composite price index. Henceforth, we normalize Pt = 1, defining the composite consumption
good to be the numeraire.
Firms There is a single firm on each island. Firms are monopolistic competitors in the goods
market, and monopsonists in the local labor market. The latter assumption is made for tractability
reasons and ensures that firms always produce as long as they can obtain funding from the financial
market.
Subject to (3)–(5), the firm’s objective is to maximize the expected present value of its profits,
given by
Et
∞∑
τ=t
mi,τ |t (Pi,τYi,τ −Wi,τLi,τ ) , (6)
where mi,τ |t = βτ−tu
−γ
i,τ /Et[u
−γ
i,t ] is the stochastic discount factor (between date-t mornings and
date-τ afternoons) of the local household.9
Information We consider a simple information structure where all learning is public and agents
have complete information about the realizations of χi,t. Moreover, there is no aggregate uncertainty;
i.e., agents have complete information about the aggregate state including the cross-sectional
distribution over (Ai,t, χi,t). The only source of uncertainty is a lack of information about the local
productivities Ai,t of each individual island. Specifically, because labor inputs and outputs are
perfectly observable, agents learn the productivities of all operating firms in the afternoon of each
period. By contrast, current productivities remain unknown for inactive firms. Let Bt = {i : Li,t > 0}
denote the set of active firms. Then the information set available to agents in the morning of date t
is
It = {χi,t}i∈[0,1] ∪ {Ai,t−1}i∈Bt−1 ∪ It−1.
9Firms maximizing profits rather than non-pledged revenues net of costs assumes that holders of non-equity
securities have sufficient means to monitor firms and enforce them to maximize the representative households’ marginal
utility from consuming the proceeds of both equity and non-equity assets.
6
Discussion Firms in our model are financed each period by pledging a fraction of their revenues
that is then traded in a financial market. While this is, of course, overly simplistic, what ultimately
matters for our model is that a firm’s funding supply depends on market beliefs about firm
fundamentals. Our model achieves this in an admittedly crude but practical way, without having to
specify a full-blown banking sector.10
A crucial assumption in our modeling is that financial markets are unable (or unwilling) to
perfectly hedge firm-specific risks. This is consistent with Barber and Odean (2000) and Goetzmann
and Kumar (2008), documenting that the vast majority of U.S. investors are under-diversified.11 As
usual, under-diversification can be motivated in different ways, including home biases (Coval and
Moskowitz, 1999), prior expertise or specialization in information collection (Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2010), and incentive-constraints that require investors to have some “skin in the game”
for monitoring purposes (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Alternatively, one can also think of our
setting as a short-cut to a class of models where investors are risk-neutral but where entrepreneurs
are exposed to idiosyncratic risks due to incentive-considerations and hence need to be compensated
for those risk-exposures (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979).
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium in the economy. We start by solving
an unconstrained firm’s problem and then include the asset market. Finally, we study the dynamics
of beliefs, which represent the state variables in this economy. We formally define the notion of
equilibrium in the last subsection.
3.1 The Firm Problem
The characterization of the firm problem is facilitated by two facts. First, conditional on households
willing to fund the firm (Qi,t > 0), it is both feasible and optimal for the firm to operate (Li,t > φ).
Second, conditional on operating, the continuation value of the firm is independent of the current
scale of production. Accordingly, the firm’s desired level of operation is the solution to a static
profit maximization problem. The following lemma summarizes the result.
Lemma 1. Labor inputs are given by Li,t = min{L¯i,t, Lopti,t }, where
Lopti,t = arg max
Li,t
Et
[
mi,t|t (Pi,tYi,t −Wi,tLi,t)
]
.
Substituting for (4) and (5), the optimal scale of production Lopti,t , conditional on being active, is
10Our assumption that firms are funded against cash flows is consistent with Lian and Ma (2017), who document
that 80 percent of non-financial corporate debt is based predominately on cash flows from operating revenues rather
than being collateralized by physical assets.
11Relatedly, a recent body of evidence documents that idiosyncratic risk significantly affects the cost of capital
to firms in stocks (Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003; Fu, 2009), bonds (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) and in bank loans
(Quijano, 2013).
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characterized by the unique positive solution to
λξ(Lopti,t − φ)(Lopti,t )ξζ = θi,t, (7)
where λ ≡ (1 + ζ)/(1 − 1/ξ) defines the markup and θi,t ≡ Et[mi,t|tA1−1/ξi,t ]ξYt is a risk-adjusted
measure of expected business conditions.
In the computations in Section 5, it will prove useful to work with a log-linear approximation
of mi,t|t.12 This allows us to explicitly express θi,t in terms of expected log-productivity, µi,t ≡
E[logAi,t|It], and the corresponding uncertainty, Σi,t ≡ Var[logAi,t|It],
log θi,t = (ξ − 1)(µi,t − γ˜Σi,t) + log Yt, (8)
where γ˜ defines the “effective degree of risk-aversion” (see Appendix A.2 for details).13
3.2 Equilibrium on the Asset Market
Standard asset pricing implies that claims on the firm’s revenue trade at a price
Qi,t = Et[mi,t|tPi,tYi,t]. (9)
Equations (9) and (3) define the usual loss-spiral between asset prices and financial constraints as
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The following lemma
states the solution to the resulting fixed-point problem.
Lemma 2. The funding constraint L¯i,t, conditional on being binding, is defined by the largest
solution to14
L¯
ξ(1+ζ)
i,t = χ
ξ
i,tθi,t max{L¯i,t − φ, 0}ξ−1. (10)
Equipped with Lemma 2, we are now ready to characterize the equilibrium scale of production.
Proposition 1. There are unique thresholds θ∗(χ) ≤ θ∗∗(χ), such that
Li,t =

L¯i,t = 0 if θi,t < θ
∗(χi,t)
L¯i,t > φ if θi,t ∈ [θ∗(χi,t), θ∗∗(χi,t)]
Lopti,t > φ if θi,t > θ
∗∗(χi,t).
12The approximation is not important for any of the formal characterizations that follow.
13Technically, γ˜ can become negative for small γ. This is because Et[Ai,t] is increasing in Σi,t due to the convexity
of the exponential function, potentially dominating the risk-aversion of households. Throughout we focus on the
interesting case where γ˜ is positive.
14Aside from the trivial solution L¯i,t = 0, there can be up to two additional solutions. Only the largest of these
solutions constitutes a stable equilibrium in the sense that the household does not strictly prefer to offer a marginally
higher price than the equilibrium price Qi,t. That is, if there exist two solutions L¯
′ < L¯′′, then the expected utility
gain from extending production to some L¯ ∈ (L¯′, L¯′′) strictly outweighs the additional cost of buying the claim.
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For all θ ≥ θ∗(χ), Lopt and L¯ are defined by (7) and (10), and are increasing in θ. The thresholds
are given by
θ∗(χ) = χ−ξλξ−1
(
1 + ζ
1 + ξζ
ξφ
)1+ξζ
(11)
θ∗∗(χ) =
χξζλξ(1+ζ)
(
φ
λχ−1
)1+ξζ
if χ ≥ λ−1
∞ else.
(12)
Proposition 1 provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium level of production on
each island as a function of risk-adjusted business expectations θi,t and the pledgeability limit χi,t.
Firms are denied funding and are forced to terminate whenever θi,t ≤ θ∗(χi,t). It is worth noting
that the threshold of operation enforced by the financial market can be much tighter than what’s
optimal from the firm’s (or a social) perspective. In particular, risk-adjusted expected date-t profits,
accounting for overhead labor costs, are positive if and only if θi,t ≥ θ∗(1). The difference between
θ∗(χi,t) and θ∗(1) therefore defines a wedge on the extensive margin of operation. To get a numerical
sense of the magnitude of the wedge, note that from (11), the wedge is given by
θ∗(χi,t)
θ∗(1)
= χ−ξi,t .
For ξ = 7.5 (implying a markup of 15 percent) and a pledgeability limit of 80% this implies a
wedge of roughly a factor 5. Decreasing pledgeability to 50%, the wedge increases to a factor of 181.
Introducing limited pledgeability therefore defines a huge region where investors are too uncertain
and pessimistic to fund the firm, even though it would be optimal for the firm to operate.
Figure 1 illustrates the characterization. For χi,t = 1, the household’s and firm’s objectives are
aligned and the firm is either efficiently terminated or operates unconstrained.15 For all χi,t < 1,
there is a wedge, leading to an increasing region of inefficient termination. Moreover, conditional
on operation, firms start out constrained and will operate unconstrained only for sufficiently large
χi,t and if investors are sufficiently optimistic and have little uncertainty about the firm’s business
conditions.
15Here, efficiency is to be understood as a constrained efficiency concept, conditional on the market structure in
goods and labor markets (monopolistic competition and monopsony). In particular, we say that a firm is terminated
efficiently if risk-adjusted expected current period profits (of the monopolistically competitive and monopsonistic firm)
are negative for all Li,t, ignoring any value of learning. If the firm’s continuation value of being active and learning
about its productivity is included in the definition of efficiency, the gap between equilibrium and efficient operation
would increase even more.
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Figure 1: Characterization of funding regimes
3.3 Belief Dynamics
To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we need to characterize how risk-adjusted business
expectations θi,t, defined in (8), evolve over time. From (2), the law of motion of beliefs is
µi,t+1 =
ρ logAi,t if i ∈ Btρµi,t if i /∈ Bt (13)
Σi,t+1 =
σ2 if i ∈ Btρ2Σi,t + σ2 if i /∈ Bt. (14)
As long as a firm is active, learning is perfect and uncertainty only reflects current innovations to
productivity. By contrast, uncertainty accumulates for inactive firms, and beliefs converge to the
unconditional prior.
3.4 General Equilibrium and Steady State
Imposing market clearing, aggregate output is given by
∫ 1
0 Ci,t di = Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Y
1−1/ξ
j,t dj
]ξ/(ξ−1)
.
From Proposition 1, Yj,t is a function of Sj,t ≡ (Aj,t, χi,t, µj,t,Σj,t) and Yt. Let Pt be the date-t
distribution over Sj,t. Since Pt is predetermined at date t, equilibrium output at date t is the
solution to Yt = Y (Pt, Yt). We confirm numerically that the solution exists and is unique for all our
simulation experiments.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for firm-level beliefs in the absence of shocks. Thin gray lines depict (θ = θ∗)-contours;
Z-shaped blue lines are (Σi,t = Σi,t−1)-loci; vertical red lines are (µi,t = µi,t−1)-loci. Arrowheads represent distinct
points in time along the plotted trajectories. Left: Case with a unique steady state (η0 < η). Right: Case with
multiple steady states (η < η0 < η).
4 Funding Freezes
We are now ready to explore the interaction between funding constraints and learning. In this
section, we illustrate the main mechanism of the paper, focusing on the partial equilibrium dynamics
of a single firm in isolation. Combining (8) and (11), a firm is denied funding if
µi,t − γ˜Σi,t ≤ η(χi,t, Yt), (15)
where η is a decreasing, log-linear function in χi,t and Yt. From (13) and (14), it then follows that
if a firm is denied funding at t, future uncertainty increases and expectations are anchored around
µi,t regardless of the realized productivity Ai,t. Past pessimism and uncertainty thus get reinforced
into future periods, creating persistently tight funding constraints L¯.
4.1 Non-stochastic Steady States and Dynamics
Let logAi,s = 0 and fix some η0 = η(χi,s, Ys) for all s. Figure 2 shows the resulting phase diagram
for two different values of η¯. The thin gray line depicts the contour where (15) holds with equality,
dividing the state space into an active and an inactive region. The red line corresponds to the
constant expectations locus (µi,t = µi,t−1), which is given by µi,t = 0 since logAi,t is mean-reverting.
The blue line corresponds to the constant uncertainty locus (Σi,t = Σi,t−1). The latter is “Z”-shaped,
because higher levels of uncertainty not only directly increase uncertainty at t+ 1 but also indirectly
by reducing the funds to firms: For sufficiently, optimistic (or pessimistic) expectations, this feedback
has no effect as firms’ access to funds will be secured (or denied) regardless of Σi,t. For moderate
levels of µi,t, however, uncertainty becomes pivotal to the operation of the firm, hence generating
multiple stationary values of uncertainty for a given belief µi,t. Specifically, for high levels of
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uncertainty, the firm is denied funding, reinforcing high levels of uncertainty, and vice versa for low
levels of uncertainty. Intersecting the two loci, we can have a unique or multiple (non-stochastic)
steady states, depending on the value of η0. (In either case, the firm’s dynamics are unique for any
aggregate sequence {Yt} as all endogenous components of Si,t are predetermined at t− 1.)
Proposition 2. There exist two thresholds η < η, such that for all η ≤ η0 ≤ η there are two
(non-stochastic) steady states at the firm-level, and otherwise there is a unique (non-stochastic)
steady state. When θi,t is approximated using (8), the thresholds are given by η = −γ˜σ2 and
η = −γ˜σ2 /(1− ρ2).
For intermediate levels of η0, funding freezes are infinitely persistent in the absence of shocks.
Accordingly, a one-time disruption in a firms’ funds (e.g., through a shock to χi,t) can indefinitely
cut off the firm from future funding.16
However, even when the steady state is unique, funding freezes may emerge as a persistent
(though not indefinite) disruption in a firm’s access to funding. This is illustrated by the gray
trajectories in the left panel of Figure 2. Along these trajectories, each arrowhead represents a
distinct point of time, so that the distance between two consecutive arrowheads can be viewed as
an inverse measure of the speed at which the state is evolving.
The three trajectories differ in the persistence of beliefs and the amount of uncertainty induced
along the path. Along the path starting to the right of the black contour line, the firm is initially
funded and beliefs thus immediately adjust to the unique steady state. The two other paths,
however, behave distinctly different: Starting to the left of the dashed contour line, households are
sufficiently pessimistic to deny funding so that learning breaks down. Accordingly, expectations only
slowly converge to the unconditional prior, whereas uncertainty accumulates to higher and higher
levels (since information about past levels of ai,t becomes less and less useful for predicting current
productivity), reinforcing tight funding constraints. Even though the steady state is unique, a firm
can find itself in a persistent “funding freeze” (lasting more than 20 periods along the left-most
trajectory).
4.2 A Temporary Financial Shock to the Pledgeability Limit
We next illustrate how a temporary reduction in the local pledgeability limit can disrupt a firm’s
access to funding, triggering funding freezes as discussed above. Fix some initial productivity and
pledgeability limit, Ai,0 = A0 and χi,0 = χ0 such that the firm is active at t = 0. Now suppose that
at t = 1, the pledgeability is reduced to χ1 < χ0 and then mechanically reverts back to χ0 at t = 3.
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics using the phase diagram developed above. In the diagram, the
drop in pledgeability results in a rightward-shift of the (θ = θ∗)-contour (depicted by the dashed
gray line). For sufficiently small χi,0, the firm is denied funding, setting in motion a downward-spiral
16See Section 4.2 for how temporary shocks to χi,t can trigger funding freezes. Alternatively, the starting two
leftmost starting beliefs depicted in Figure 2 can be implemented by a sequence of productivities ai,t+s = 0 for all
s 6= −1 and at−1 = ρ−1µ0. Similarly, one could derive independent fluctuations in µi,t by endowing agents with an
additional signal that communicates a noisy version of ai,t in the mornings of each date.
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Figure 3: Dynamic response to a drop in χ at t = 1 and a subsequent recovery at t = 3. Arrowheads depict distinct
points in time along the plotted trajectory.
between uncertainty and reinforcement of the funding constraint. Once uncertainty has passed the
original (θ = θ∗)-contour line (depicted by the solid gray line), even a recovery of the pledgeability
limit will not end the spiral, resulting in funding freezes that may significantly outlast the exogenous
disruption in pledgeability.
The response of local output along with the responses of (χi,t, µi,t,Σi,t) can be seen in Figure 4.
To isolate the contribution of the endogenous-uncertainty channel, we contrast the model’s response
(starred green lines) with a counterfactual response where the firm suffers the same loss in pledgeability
but uncertainty is fixed at its lower bound, Σ = σ2 (dashed black lines).
17 In both cases, output
initially drops to zero as long as pledgeability is reduced. The difference between the model and the
counterfactual emerges at t = 3. Whereas output recovers in the counterfactual once pledgeability
is restored, the firm continues to be denied funding in the presence of endogenously increased
uncertainty. Since the parameters imply a unique steady state at χ0, beliefs and funding eventually
recover when µi,t crosses the (θ = θ
∗)-contour line in Figure 3. At this point, the firm continues
operation, uncertainty drops to σ2 and µi,t = ρ logAi,t−1.18
Comment on misallocation There are two sources of misallocation here (aside from the two
monopoly distortions). First, the financial constraint drives a discrepancy between the equilibrium
17The parametrization of the model is detailed in Section XX. Throughout the response, Yt is fixed at its steady
state level.
18Since there are no shocks to Ai,t along the response path, expectations are correct throughout (µi,t = logAi,t).
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Figure 4: Dynamic responses to a drop in χ at t = 1 and a subsequent recovery at t = 3. Starred green lines are
model responses; dashed black lines are counterfactual responses where uncertainty is exogenously fixed at Σ = σ2 .
use of labor and the optimal use of labor given θi,t as illustrated in Figure 1. Second, an inefficient
response due to undetected changes in productivity, reflecting that competitive financial markets
have no incentives to experiment to identify productive firms as all potential gains are arbitraged
away under perfect competition in financial markets. Along the simulated response path, this
manifests itself by the fact that, as long as the firm is denied funding, any change in Ai,t goes
undetected, potentially implying huge efficiency losses from forgone business opportunities.
5 Aggregate Financial Shock
In this section, we explore how an aggregate disruption in firms’ access to funding propagates
through our model.
5.1 Extended Model and Parametrization
Extended model So far, agents did not receive any information on inactive firms. For our
numerical experiment we depart from this strong assumption and provide agents with an additional
noisy signal, si,t = logAi,t−1 + ui,t, disclosing past productivities subject to a Gaussian noise term
ui,t with zero mean and variance σ
2
u. The signal si,t plays two roles: First, it gives agents a mean to
learn about a firm’s business potential (to a limited degree) even if the firm is inactive. Second, it
introduces some independent source of variation in agents’ beliefs regarding inactive firms which, as
we show below, has interesting implications.
The information set available to agents in the morning of date t is now
It = {χi,t, si,t}i∈[0,1] ∪ {Ai,t−1}i∈Bt−1 ∪ It−1.
Using the Kalman filter to recursively filter through information about inactive firms, agents’ beliefs
about firm i in the morning of date t are given by
µi,t =
ρ logAi,t−1 if i ∈ Bt−1ρ [δi,tµi,t−1 + (1− δi,t)si,t] else (16)
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and
Σi,t =
σ2 if i ∈ Bt−1ρ2δi,tΣi,t−1 + σ2 else, (17)
where δi,t = (1 + σ
−2
u Σi,t−1)−1. Replacing (13) and (14) by (16) and (17), the equilibrium charac-
terization given in Section 3 remains fully valid.
Outside observers For the upcoming exploration it will also be useful to introduce a “background
layer” of outside observers (or forecasters) j ∈ [0, 1]. In addition to It, these forecasters each observe
a private signal ωij,t = logAi,t + ψij,t, where ψ is normally distributed with zero mean and variance
σ2ψ. For simplicity, at each date t, the previous generation of forecasters is replaced by a new one.
The belief of forecaster j about firm i’s productivity at date t is given by
µ˜ij,t =
Σ−1i,t µi,t + σ
−2
ψ ωij,t
Σ−1i,t + σ
−2
ψ
. (18)
In Section 6, we use these forecasters’ beliefs to compare the model’s predictions with micro data
from a survey of professional forecasters. To keep the model tractable, we assume that forecasters
do not interact with the rest of the economy.
Parametrization We interpret one period as a quarter. The inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply ζ is set to 0.5, the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods is set to 7.5, and
the effective degree of relative risk aversion γ˜ is set to 3.19 These parameters are within the range
typically used by the literature. The productivity parameters are set to ρ = 0.9 and σ = 0.15 (e.g.,
Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajˇsek, 2016, Appendix 4). Next, we set φ to match a 20 percent share of
overhead labor at the steady state. This is consistent with Valerie A. Ramey (1991) who reviews
the empirical literature and considers 20 percent a reasonable consensus estimate.20
The process of firm-specific pledgeability limits is modeled as a two-state Markov process on
X = {χ, χ} with a financially fragile state χ and a financially sound state χ. We fix the latter at
χ = 1, implying full pledgeability in the good state. The transition matrix is given by
Ξ =
[
1− p p
p 1− p
]
.
The financially fragile state χ and the transition probability p are chosen to roughly match the
8-quarter, 16-quarter and 24-quarter survival rates of newly active firms to 0.66, 0.5 and 0.4,
respectively, consistent with the empirical 2-year, 4-year and 6-year survival rates of new firms (c.f.,
Headd, 2003). This yields χ = 0.63 and p = 0.07.
19While with our utility specification the coefficient of relative risk aversion depends on γ, ζ and v and fluctuates over
time as a function of Ci,t and Li,t, its effect on risk-perceptions remains constant given the log-linear approximation
to mi,t|t. Moreover, fixing γ˜, there is no need to take a separate stand on γ and v.
20See also the discussion in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013) who conclude that the reasonable range
for overhead labor is between 10 and 30 percent.
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Table 1: Parameters used for numerical experiment.
Parameter ζ ξ γ˜ φ p χ χ ρ σ σu σψ
Value 0.50 7.50 3.0 0.052 0.07 0.63 1.00 0.90 0.15 0.80 0.97
Finally, we set σu to match Corr(
∫ 1
0 µ˜ij,t dj, logAi,t) = 0.859, consistent with the empirical
pre-crisis correlation between the average professional firm-specific forecasts and realized returns on
assets (see Section 6 for a description of the data). Similarly, we set σψ to match the average belief
dispersion among forecasters regarding each firm,
∫ 1
0
√
Varj [µ˜ij,t] di = 0.023.
All calibration targets are matched at the steady state.21 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated
parameters.
Computation strategy In order to solve for the equilibrium distribution Pt, we discretize the
state space Si,t using a combination of Rouwenhorst’s method (c.f., Kopecky and Suen, 2010) and a
discrete numerical approximation to the agent’s equilibrium beliefs. See Appendix B for details on
our computation strategy.
5.2 Simulation of an Aggregate Financial Shock
We are now ready to explore the economy’s response to an aggregate disruption in firms’ access to
funding. The economy is initialized at its stochastic steady state where Pt = Pt−1.22 We consider a
one-shot perturbation to Ξ at date 0 that increases the transition probability Pr(χi,0 = χ|χi,−1 = χ)
to (p+ 0.1), while keeping the reverse transition probability at p = 0.07. The disruption effectively
reallocates a random mass 0.05 of firms from the financially sound state into the financially fragile
state (reflecting a 10 percent increase in financially fragile firms). At t = 1, Ξ is reverted back
to its calibrated value and the economy starts converging back to the steady state. Throughout
we assume that the perturbation to Ξ is common knowledge so that Yt ∈ It for all t. With this
assumption, our equilibrium characterization applies without change.
Figure 5 displays the model’s response to the perturbation at t = 0, depicted by the starred
green lines. To isolate the role of the endogenous amplification through rising uncertainty from
the exogenous impact of tighter funding requirements, we contrast the model’s responses with two
counterfactuals. First, dashed black lines display the direct impact of tighter pledgeability limits,
keeping uncertainty evolving according to its steady state dynamics. Second, solid red lines show
the propagation through rising uncertainty, eliminating the direct impact of tighter pledgeability
limits.23 All responses are in percentage deviations from their respective steady state values.
21Due to overidentification and computational restrictions, we match the targeted moments with a small numerical
error. At our parametrization, the overhead labor share is 19.97 percent, the survival rates are, respectively, 0.643,
0.505 and 0.405, the correlation between beliefs and realized productivities is 0.851, and the average belief dispersion
is 0.023.
22We confirm numerically that our model has a unique steady state distribution for the chosen parameter values.
23Formally, we compute the counterfactuals as follows. Let ∆ =
[
0 0
.1 −.1
]
denote the initial perturbation of Ξ at
date 0. Then the distribution over {χi,t} at date t can be derived directly from the steady state distribution over
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses to a one-shot perturbation in Ξ at t = 0. All responses are in percentage deviations from
the steady state. Starred green lines are model responses; dashed black lines are “pure financial shock” counterfactuals
where uncertainty evolves according to its steady state dynamics; solid red lines are “pure uncertainty” counterfactuals
where the direct impact of the financial shock is shut down.
Amplification and persistence Because uncertainty is predetermined, the impact response at
date 0 is fully explained by a tightening of pledgeability limits. Starting at date 1, however, the
adverse effects of rising uncertainty starts to both amplify and prolong the crisis relative to the
case where uncertainty evolves according to its steady state dynamics. At t = 5, output in the
counterfactual isolating the direct impact of the financial shock recovers by more than 50 percent to
0.97 percent below steady state. By comparison, at t = 5, output is still 1.98 percent below steady
in the endogenous uncertainty economy, amounting to a recovery of less than 7 percent. In terms of
half-lives, recovery takes more than twice as long in the model economy (11 quarters) compared to
the counterfactual isolating the direct impact of the financial shock (5 quarters).24
χi,t using a one-time perturbation of Ξ to Ξˆt = Ξ + ∆Ξ
t. Correspondingly, the direct impact of tighter pledgeability
limits is derived by initializing the economy at each date at its steady state distribution P¯ and perturbing Ξ to Ξˆt.
Effectively, we induce the counterfactual to follow the same path for {χi,t} as in the equilibrium response. However,
by re-initializing the economy at its steady state in every period, we fix the path for uncertainty (and the ability of
agents to learn from past production) as if the economy would have been in its steady state until t− 1. Conversely, we
define the counterfactual isolating the role of uncertainty by initializing the economy at each date at the equilibrium
distribution Pt copied from the model’s equilibrium response and perturb Ξ to Ξˆ−1t−1 to undo the perturbation of
{χi,t}. Effectively, this keeps the distribution of {χi,t} at its steady state path, while inducing the same path of
uncertainty (and agent’s ability to learn from past production) as in the model’s equilibrium response.
24Another way to measure the direct impact of the financial shock is to look at the mass of firms with χi,t = χ
relative to the steady state. The response (not plotted) looks similar to the counterfactual isolating the direct impact
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Figure 6: Decomposition of output response.
Figure 6 illustrates the relative contributions of the financial shock itself relative to the endoge-
nously rising uncertainty.25 In line with the above explanations, the contribution of endogenously
rising uncertainty increases over the course of the crisis, becoming the main driver after about 5
quarters.
Risk premia, pessimism, volatility and dispersion Rising uncertainty also helps explaining a
few financial market characteristics typically associated with financial crises. First, rising uncertainty
increases risk premia. Let Ri,t = log(Pi,tYi,t/Qi,t) define log-returns from pledgeable claims. In
equilibrium, we have26
Ri,t = (1− 1/ξ) (logAi,t − µi,t + γ˜Σi,t) . (19)
Conditional on date-t information, expected returns are hence given by
E [Ri,t|It] = (1− 1/ξ)γ˜Σi,t, (20)
illustrating how risk-premia rise in uncertainty.
Interestingly, (20) understates the risk-premia conditional on realized returns. This is because
of a selection effect introduced by the exogenous signal si,t: Realizations in si,t that induce overly
of the financial shock, sharing the same 5-quarter half-life.
25The two contributions add up to slightly less than 1 due to the model’s non-linear response.
26Note that returns are well-defined in the limit as L→ φ due to L’Hospital’s rule (despite payouts converging to
zero).
18
optimistic beliefs are likely to result in firm i being funded. This allows agents to effectively learn
about the firm’s true business potential, quickly correcting overly optimistic beliefs. By contrast,
overly pessimistic beliefs are more likely to result in firm i being denied funding and are therefore
endogenously more persistent. This discrepancy in the persistence of optimism and pessimism
results in agents having, on average, more pessimistic beliefs about business conditions, thereby
increasing the realized returns relative to (20). Panel (d) of Figure 5 plots average returns along
the simulated response path. Caused by both rising uncertainty and an increased pessimism (not
plotted), average returns increase by up to 2.5 percent relative to their steady state level throughout
the crisis.27 The response is exclusively driven by endogenous variations in agent’s ability to learn;
i.e., the direct impact of the financial shock on risk premia is zero.
Relatedly, the model also predicts an increased return volatility during financial crisis. To see
this, consider the one-step ahead volatility conditional on date-(t− 1) realizations, Var[Ri,t|t− 1] =
(1− 1/ξ)2Var[logAi,t − µi,t].28 Substituting for (16), we have
Var[Ri,t|t− 1] = (1− 1/ξ)2
σ2 if i ∈ Bt−1σ2 + ρ2(1− δi,t)2σ2u else.
Since δi,t is decreasing in Σi,t−1, we have that higher uncertainty results in higher realized volatility.
Intuitively, as uncertainty increases, agents place increasingly more weight on the exogenous signal
si,t for the purpose of forming their beliefs. As a result, their beliefs, and hence asset prices, become
increasingly exposed to the exogenous noise term ui,t.
Finally, increased volatility of firm-level returns also translates into an increased cross-sectional
dispersion of returns.29 Panel (e) of Figure 5 plots the cross-sectional dispersion over Ri,t relative
to its steady state level. As can be seen, rising uncertainty also induces the dispersion to rise along
the response path. Again, the response is zero throughout the counterfactual which isolates the
direct impact of the financial shock.
Disagreement A final prediction of our model is with respect to the beliefs of market observers.
From (18), the degree of “disagreement” among market observers is given by
Varj [µ˜ij,t] =
σ−1ψ
Σ−1i,t + σ
−2
ψ
. (21)
27In our simulation, the contribution of pessimism to return premia is small (2.34 percent at the steady state).
Accordingly, the response of the average risk premium closely mirrors the response of uncertainty even though
pessimism significantly increases along the return path (up to 20 percent at the peak relative to its steady state level).
28Alternatively, one may also be interested in the variance of returns conditional on date-t information. Computing
the conditional variance over (19), we have Var [Ri,t|It] = (1− 1/ξ)2Σi,t. Clearly, higher uncertainty about logAi,t
directly translates into a higher expected variability of returns.
29Generally, the (unconditional) cross-sectional dispersion will be larger than the one-step ahead volatility, as it
accumulates idiosyncratic volatility over time and is further amplified by a feedback from beliefs into funding, which
results in variation over the Σi,t-term in (19).
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Clearly, disagreement rises with uncertainty. Intuitively, as less can be learned about firms that are
denied funding, market observers rely more on their own private information. As a result, (average)
disagreement among market observers increases during financial crisis as an increasing number of
firms becomes constrained.30 These predictions are in line with Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014)
who document that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns and higher
return volatility.
6 A Test Using Micro Data
At the core of our model is a two-way interaction between uncertainty and financial constraints.
In this section, we attempt to test for the predicted link between a firms’ access to funding and
uncertainty among market participants using a combination of firm-level survey data, accounting
data and stock price data.
6.1 Data
In the following we describe the data sources and define the main variables used for our empirical
exploration. Technical details regarding the construction of our dataset are contained in Appendix C.
We use use forecasts about earnings per share (EPS) by financial analysts from the IBES
database to construct a proxy for uncertainty among financial market participants about firm-level
fundamentals. To make these forecasts comparable to our model, we follow Senga (2016) and
transform EPS-forecasts into forecasts regarding returns on assets (ROA). In our dataset, the
median productivity as measured by ROA is 3.7 percent (−9.5 percent at the 10th percentile, 13
percent at the 90th percentile). Let µEPSij,t denote analyst j’s expectation about firm i’s EPS at
date t.31 Beliefs regarding returns on assets are computed as
µROAij,t = µ
EPS
ij,t ×
number of outstanding sharesi,t
total assetsi,t−1
.
As our primary proxy for firm-level uncertainty, we look at the cross-analysts dispersion of forecast
errors, defined by
σfcei,t ≡
√
Varj
[
µROAij,t − ROAi,t
]
.
Noting that ROAi,t is constant across all forecasters j, σ
fce
i,t can be equivalently interpreted as
disagreement among forecasters.
For the purpose of measuring financial constraints, we follow the corporate finance literature
and combine various balance sheet data to proxy for firms’ access to funds using the “KZ-index”
30For simplicity, all active agents in our model share the same information set It, sparing us from dealing with
infinite regress (Townsend, 1983). Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that our predictions about disagreement are
not limited to professional forecasters, but would more generally carry over to any set of agents with exogenous private
signals.
31As in Senga (2016), we extract those forecasts 8 months prior to each firm’s fiscal-year end month. See Appendix C
for details on the timing of our variables.
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Table 2: Financial constraints and uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel a: Dependent variable is forecast-error dispersion σfcei,t
Financially constrained .081 .079 .079 .031
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.008)
Observations 47 342 47 342 47 335 46 141
Adj. R-sq. .010 .023 .078 .709
Panel b: Dependent variable is stock returns Ri,t
Financially constrained .030 .034 .034 .146
(.025) (.024) (.024) (.036)
Observations 51 993 51 993 51 990 50 787
Adj. R-sq. .000 .116 .117 .130
Year × month FE no yes yes yes
Sector FE (4 digit) no no yes no
Firm FE no no no yes
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-level are in parenthesis.
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk and Saa´-Requejo (2001).32 Based
on a firm’s kzi,t-score, we classify it as likely to be constrained if its current score is at or above
the 95th percentile in a given calendar year. To check the robustness of our results, we have also
implemented a variety of alternative classifications based on dividend payments and debt-to-capital
ratios, obtaining similar results.
Finally, we augment our dataset with data on stock returns from CRSP in order to test
the model’s prediction regarding risk premia and return dispersion. The resulting dataset is an
unbalanced yearly panel, ranging from 1976 to 2016, covering on average 1979 firms per year.
6.2 Financial Constraints and Uncertainty
To explore whether the predicted link between financial constraints and uncertainty is present in
the data, we run a simple OLS regression of forecast-error dispersion σfcei,t on the (kzi,t−1 ≥ 0.95%)-
indicator.33 Panel (a) of Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients, controlling for different combi-
nations of fixed effects. The estimated effect is roughly constant over the first three specifications
where we control for a combination of year, fiscal-end year month and 4-digit sector fixed effects. In
all three specifications, the forecast-error dispersion is increased by about 0.08 for firms that are
classified as financially constrained. Controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the estimated difference
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms is reduced to 0.031.
32The KZ-score is a weighted combination of a firm’s cash flow to total capital, its market to book ratio, its debt to
capital, dividends to total capital, and cash holdings to capital (see Appendix C for details). The weighting coefficients
are based on an ordered logit regression relating those accounting variables to an explicit classification of firms into
categories of financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont, Polk and Saa´-Requejo, 2001). Firms with a
higher kzi,t are more likely to be constrained.
33The constraint-indicator is lagged by one year to align it as closely as possible to the date at which forecasts
about t are formed by analysts. Similar results hold when we use kzi,t instead.
21
Table 3: Conditional heteroskedasticity model for Ri,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financially constrained 1.045 1.015 .958 .481
(.063) (.059) (.057) (.064)
Avg. marginal effect on σi,t .122 .116 .113 .061
Observations 51 993 51 993 51 990 50 787
Adj. R-sq. 0.007 0.075 .107 .190
Year × month FE no yes yes yes
Sector FE (4 digit) no no yes no
Firm FE no no no yes
Note: Table reports results for the second-stage regression σˆ2i,t = exp(xi,tβ+ i,t) where σˆi,t
are estimated from the residuals of linear first stage estimations of Ri,t on the same set of
independent variables as in the second stage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
These results lend support to the model’s prediction, as the coefficient is positive and statistically
significant across all specifications. To check the quantitative significance of our results, we compute
the corresponding statistic at the steady state of the calibrated model. Using (21), we find that
for firms that are denied funding, σfcei,t is on average increased by 0.043, roughly in line with our
empirical estimates.
Closely related to the predictions regarding uncertainty, our model also predicts higher risk
premia, an increased return volatility and greater dispersion in returns for financially constrained
firms. In panel (b) of Table 2, we regress CRSP stock returns on the financial constrainedness
indicator. For specifications (1)–(3), we estimate financially constrained firms to have about 3
percent higher returns than financially unconstrained firms, but cannot reject that the effect is zero.
This may be due to the fact that funding is, in part, determined based on observable characteristics,
so that firms that are known to be unproductive also receive less funding. Specification (4) partially
controls for this by controlling for firm-specific fixed effects. Indeed, the estimated effect is now
increased to 0.146 and is found to be statistically significant. By comparison, our calibrated model
predicts a risk premia that is increased by 0.129 for firms that are denied funding.
Finally, we use a conditional heteroskedasticity model using an exponential variance function
to test the model’s prediction regarding return volatility and return dispersion. Table 3 reports
the estimated coefficient of the variance function. As predicted by the model, we find a positive
and statistically significant effect on the return dispersion across all specifications, with average
marginal effects on the standard deviation of returns ranging from 6.1 percent to 12.2 percentage
points. By comparison, the model predicts an increase in the return dispersion by 12.3 percentage
points for firms without funding.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a theory of endogenous uncertainty and its interaction with firms’
financial conditions. In the model, firms require access to external finance in order to produce.
When uncertainty about a firm’s fundamentals is high, access to finance is limited, and the firm’s
production is reduced, or even halted. This endogenously limits production of information about
the firm as well, increasing uncertainty and perpetuating the funding problems. While present even
in normal times, this feedback loop becomes especially powerful in an aggregate setting, where a
temporary financial shock can significantly increase average uncertainty and create a prolonged
economic downturn.
We have so far refrained from policy analysis in this paper. There are, however, several policy
insights that merit further discussion. First, recapitalizing banks (investors) is not an effective policy
to restore lending in the model. In fact, investments are done by households, who are unconstrained
at all times, so such a policy would not have any effects. The critical friction in bad times is an
informational one and cannot easily be undone by tranfers to banks. This, however, suggests a
second policy action: direct transfers to firms. Even if the government has access to the same
information as everyone else in the economy, providing transfers or cheap loans to inactive firms can
crowd in lending in future periods due to an information externality: a re-activated firm produces
information that lets future private investors decide whether to resume private lending. Finally, if
the government can somehow increase transparency, for instance by improving reporting standards,
this could be useful during a financial crisis.
In this paper, we have mainly focused on the effects of financial shocks. However, the model’s
internal propagation mechanism applies similarly to other types of economic shocks, such as aggregate
demand shocks. For example, by reducing revenues, a fall in aggregate demand exacerbates the
financial friction at the heart of the model, increasing the fraction of inactive firms (cf., equation
15). This raises uncertainty going forward, so that, even as demand recovers, a supply problem
(uncertainty and tight financial conditions) remains. Conversely, strong demand (e.g. due to
accommodative monetary policy) can help shift firms into business, and thereby reduce uncertainty
and increase the allocative efficiency of the economy.
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A Mathematical Appendix (for online publication)
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First note that for all Qi,t > 0 it is feasible for the firm to operate (L¯i,t > φ). To see this, suppose it
were not. Then Li,t ≤ L¯i,t ≤ φ and, hence, Yi,t = 0. But then, from (9), Qi,t = 0, a contradiction.
Next, substituting (3) into (9) and rearranging, we get
χi,tEt[mi,t|tPi,tYi,t]−Wi,tL¯i,t = 0. (22)
By contrast, from (6), a sufficient condition for the firm to operate is
Et[mi,t|tPi,tYi,t]−Wi,tLi,t ≥ 0. (23)
Comparing (22) and (23), we have that whenever operation is feasible, it is also optimal for the firm
to operate. To complete the proof, it suffices to note that conditional on producing, the continuation
value of the firm is constant in Li,t.
A.2 Log-linearization of mi,t|t
By definition, mi,t|t = u
−γ
i,t /Et[u
−γ
i,t ]. Taking a log-linear approximation to ui,t, we have
log ui,t ≈ f(Zi,t, Li,t, Yt) + κ(1− 1/ξ) log(Ai,t)
for κ = Y¯ /[Y¯ − (L¯1+ζ − v)/(1 + ζ)] and some log-linear function f . Noting that Zi,t, Li,t, Yt ∈ It,
we get
mi,t|t ≈
A
−γκ(1−1/ξ)
i,t
Et[A
−γκ(1−1/ξ)
i,t ]
.
Substituting into θi,t = Et[mi,t|tA
1−1/ξ
i,t ]
ξYt, we have
log θi,t = ξ log
(
Et[A
(1−γκ)(1−1/ξ)
i,t ]
Et[A
−γκ(1−1/ξ)
i,t ]
)
+ log Yt
= (ξ − 1) (µi,t − γ˜Σi,t) + log Yt
where γ˜ ≡ (γκ− 1/2)(1− 1/ξ).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Combining (1), (3), (4), (5) and (9), we get
L¯i,t = χi,tEt[mi,t|tA
1−1/ξ
i,t ]Y
1/ξ
t max{Li,t − φ, 0}1−1/ξ/Lζi,t
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or, substituting out θi,t = Et[mi,t|tA
1−1/ξ
i,t ]
ξYt,
L¯i,t = χi,tθ
1/ξ
i,t max{L¯i,t − φ, 0}1−1/ξ/Lζi,t.
Conditional on L¯i,t being binding, we obtain
L¯
ξ(1+ζ)
i,t = χ
ξ
i,tθi,t max{L¯i,t − φ, 0}ξ−1. (24)
Tracing out the steps above, the left-hand side of (24) corresponds to the asset price Qi,t, whereas
the right-hand side corresponds to the weighted expected value Et[mi,t|tPi,tYi,t]. For the equilibrium
to be stable in the sense that no single investor could profitably extend lending by paying a price
Qi,t above the equilibrium price, it therefore must be that
g(L¯) ≡ L¯ξ(1+ζ) − χξi,tθi,t(L¯− φ)ξ−1
is strictly positive for all L¯ larger than the equilibrium level. Let L¯′′ define the largest solution
to g(L¯) = 0. Clearly, limL¯→∞ g′′(L¯) > 0 so that for all L¯ > L¯′′, we have g(L¯) > 0. Moreover, by
continuity, for any solution L¯′ < L¯′′ it must hold that there exist a L¯ > L¯′ such that g(L¯) < 0,
violating stability.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the threshold for operation, θ∗(χ), first. Following the proof of Lemma 2, equation (10)
has a solution L¯ > φ if and only if there exists a solution to g(L¯) = 0. Rearranging, the condition
reads
g˜(L¯i,t) ≡ (L¯i,t − φ)1−ξL¯ξ(1+ζ)i,t = χξi,tθi,t. (25)
The left-hand side of (25) defines a quasi-convex function g˜ in L¯ with the unique minimum
L¯0 =
1 + ζ
1 + ξζ
ξφ.
Hence, (25) has a solution if and only
θi,t ≥ θ∗(χi,t) ≡ χ−ξi,t g˜(L¯0) = χ−ξi,t λξ−1
(
1 + ζ
1 + ξζ
ξφ
)1+ξζ
.
Moreover, since the largest solution to (10) corresponds to the upward-sloping arm of g˜, we have
that for all θi,t ≥ θ∗(χi,t), L¯ is increasing in θi,t.
Conditional on operating, the firm is constrained whenever Lopti,t > L¯i,t. From (7) and (10),
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define the inverse functions
(Lopt)−1(L) ≡ λξ(L− φ)Lξζ
L¯−1(L) ≡ χ−ξi,t (L− φ)1−ξLξ(1+ζ).
The two functions intersect on (φ,∞) if and only if χi,t > λ−1. Because both functions are
continuous on (φ,∞), it thus must hold that in the case where χi,t ≤ λ−1, active firms are either
always constrained or always unconstrained. To see which one is the case, compare L¯(θ∗) = L0 with
Lopt(θ∗). Specifically, since Lopt is increasing in θ, we have that Lopt(θ∗) ≥ L0 if and only if
(Lopt)−1(L0) ≤ θ∗
or, substituting for L0 and θ
∗, if and only if χ ≤ 1, which holds by assumption. We conclude that
for χi,t < λ
−1, the firm is always constrained.
In the case where χi,t ≥ λ−1, a unique intersection, L¯(θ) = Lopt(θ), exists and is given by
L∗∗ =
φ
1− (λχi,t)−1 θ
∗∗ = λξ(1+ζ)χξζi,t
(
φ
λχi,t − 1
)1+ζξ
.
Using the implicit function theorem, we have
∂Lopt
∂θ
=
λ−ξL−ξζ
1 + ξζ(1− φ/L)
∂L¯
∂θ
=
χξi,t(L− φ)ξL−ξ(1+ζ) 1ξ−1
−1 + λ(1− φ/L) .
Comparing slopes at L∗∗, ∂Lopt(θ∗∗)/∂θ < ∂L¯(θ∗∗)/∂θ, and hence L¯(θ) ≥ Lopt(θ) if and only if
θ ≥ θ∗∗.
Summarizing the two cases, L¯i,t ≥ Lopti,t if and only if
θi,t ≥ θ∗∗(χi,t) =
λξ(1+ζ)χ
ξζ
i,t
(
φ
λχi,t−1
)1+ζξ
if χi,t ≥ λ−1
∞ else.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
From (15), the contour line is upward-sloping in µi,t, implying that the upper arm of the Σ-locus
(Σ = σ2 /(1− ρ2)) is overlapping with the lower arm (Σ = σ2 < Σ) for some µ ∈ [µ, µ]. Specifically,
from (15), µ = γ˜Σ + η and µ = γ˜Σ + η. Accordingly, both arms of the Σ-locus intersect the µ-locus
(µ = 0), if and only if
γ˜Σ + η ≤ 0 ≤ γ˜Σ + η
30
or
−γ˜Σ ≤ η ≤ −γ˜Σ.
Summarizing, there are two steady states whenever η ∈ [η, η] with η = −γ˜σ2 and η = −γ˜σ2 /(1−ρ2).
Otherwise, there is a unique steady state at either Σ (for η < η) or at Σ (for η > η).
B Computational Appendix (for online publication)
In order to efficiently discretize the state space, we rewrite expectations (16) for all i /∈ Bt−1 in
terms of the last observed productivity, alasti,t ≡ logAi,t−k−1, and the number of consecutive periods
k prior to t that the firm was denied funding. Noting that (17) defines a deterministic sequence
{Σk}, we have
µi,t|k≥1 = ρk+1alasti,t + ρ(1− δk)(s˜i,t + s˜ui,t), (26)
where δk = (1 + σ
−2
u Σk−1)−2,
s˜i,t = ρ
1− δk−1
1− δk s˜

i,t−1 + i,t−1 (27)
s˜ui,t = ρδk
1− δk−1
1− δk s˜

i,t−1 + ui,t, (28)
and where s˜i,t and s˜
u
i,t are initialized at zero for k = 1.
Our numerical implementation exploits that δk converges to a constant as k →∞, yielding
s˜i,t|k→∞ = ρs˜i,t−1 + i,t−1 (29)
s˜ui,t|k→∞ = ρδ∞s˜i,t−1 + ui,t. (30)
To obtain a simple representation of the state space, we approximate (27) and (28) using (29)
and (30) for all k ≥ 1. To evaluate the loss from our approximation, we compute the expected
approximation error, finding that is quantitatively insignificant.34 Given the approximation, we
have
s˜i,t|k→∞ = ai,t−1 − ρkalasti,t , (31)
allowing us to rewrite (µi,t,Σi,t) in terms of (ai,t−1, alasti,t , ki,t, s˜
u
i,t).
Adding χi,t, we can then solve our model on the following state space
{χi,t} × {ai,t−1} × {alasti,t } × {s˜ui,t} × {ki,t}. (32)
While the dimensionality of (32) is increased by 1 relative to {Si,t}, its complexity is significantly
34By construction, the error is zero for k ∈ {0, 1}. For k ≥ 2, the error peaks at k = 2 where the approximation
results in an expected 2.09 percent change in µi,t. For larger k, the error quickly diminishes, falling to less than 0.5
percent for k ≥ 7.
31
reduced for two reasons. First, (26) and (31) converge in k at a rate of ρ and {Σk} converges at
a rate of ρ2. Accordingly, we can truncate k at some large number k¯ without changing any of
the dynamics. In our simulation, we set k¯ = 70. Second, s˜ui,t evolves exogenously to any of the
other variables (conditionally on being initialized at 0 for k = 1). Accordingly, we can efficiently
approximate both {ai,t} and {s˜ui,t} on a small grid using the usual Rouwenhorst approximation (c.f.,
Kopecky and Suen, 2010). In our simulation, we use a 5-point grid for {ai,t} and a 3-point grid for
{s˜ui,t}. Using finer grids has no significant impact on our results. Overall, this yields a manageable
grid consisting of 2× 5× 5× 3× 70 = 10500 states.
C Data Appendix (for online publication)
Our dataset is a yearly panel of public US firms. Forecast data is extracted from the Institutional
Brokers Estimate System (IBES). Returns are obtained from the CRSP database and are adjusted
for splits and dividends. All balance sheet data is from the COMPUSTAT database. From the
original sample, we exclude all financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6799) and firms in the
electricity sector (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999). The resulting dataset ranges from 1976 to
2016 and covers, on average, 1979 firms per year.35 All variables are winsorized at the 1 percent
level.
A unit observation is defined by firm i and year t, where t refers to the year in which earnings
are realized. Let mi,t denote the fiscal-year end month of firm i. All balance sheet data and realized
earnings per share (EPS) for observation (i, t) are extracted at mi,t. As in Senga (2016), we match
each observation (i, t) with analysts’ EPS-forecasts, µEPSij,t , extracted 8 months prior to mi,t. That is,
if in 2007, firm i’s fiscal-year ends in March, then µEPSij,2007 would be extracted in July 2006. Similarly,
returns are synced with the fiscal-year end month of each observation, computed from 12 months
prior to mi,t to mi,t.
The variables used for our empirical exploration are defined in the main body of the paper.
The KZ-index underlying our classification of financial constraints is based on Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) and Lamont, Polk and Saa´-Requejo (2001). Specifically,
kzi,t = −1.001909× cashflowi,t
ki,t−1
+ 0.2826389×Qi,t + 3.139193× debti,t
total capitali,t
−
− 39.3678× dividendsi,t
ki,t−1
− 1.314759× cashi,t
ki,t−1
,
where cashflowi,t is the sum of COMPUSTAT items “income before extraordinary items” and
“depreciation and amortization”, Qi,t is (“market capitalization” + “total shareholder’s equity” −
“book value of common equity” − “deferred tax assets”)/“total shareholder’s equity”, debti,t is
“long-term debt” + “debt in current liabilities”, total capitali,t is “long-term debt” + “debt in current
liabilities” + “stockholders equity“, and ki,t is “total property, plants and equipment” (see the
35Due to incomplete balance sheet data and firms with less than 2 forecasters for which σfcei,t is not defined, the
effective number of observations is reduced for some of our empirical tests.
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Appendix to Lamont, Polk and Saa´-Requejo, 2001 for a listing of the corresponding COMPUSTAT
items).
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